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Daniel Rothschild and Gabriel Segal 
 
Truth-conditional semantics is the project of determining a way of assigning truth-conditions to sentences 
based on A) the extension of their constituents and B) their syntactic mode of composition. Truth-
conditional semantics is the major research project of linguistic semantics and the project and its prospects 
are a central concern in contemporary philosophy of language.1 
 
Some linguists and philosophers argue that the fact that the extension of certain predicates appears to change 
dramatically across different contexts indicates that there is a fundamental problem with truth-conditional 
semantics.2 We will state one version of this problem and outline an approach to it.  We hope to advance the 
discussion of the issue by A) giving the explicit semantic theory and B) discussing some empirical 
considerations that motivate our approach (or at least fail to disconfirm it!). 
  
                                                
1 See Harman (1972), Lycan (1984), Higginbotham (1985), Larson and Segal 
(1995), and Heim and Kratzer (1998). 
2 For discussion of this particular issue see Lahav (1989) Travis (1994) Szabo 
(2001), and Reimer (2002).  For more general challenges to truth-conditional 
compositionality see Chomsky (1977), Sperber and Wilson (1986) Carston 
(2002), Recanati (2003) Cappelen and LePore (2005). 
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Two vignettes3 can illustrate the phenomenon of predicates appearing to have context-dependent extensions: 
The Greengrocer 
The greengrocer stocks two types of watermelons. Both types are green on the outside, one has red 
flesh and the other has yellow flesh.  A customer asks for a red watermelon.  The greengrocer points 
to one and says, ‘How about this one? It's red.’ 
The Artist’s Studio 
An artist is painting a still-life.  On his desk is a red-skinned apple and that same watermelon, still 
green on the outside and red-fleshed.  The artists points to the apple and says ‘It’s red.’ He then 
points to the watermelon and says, ‘It’s not red.’  
It is plausible to assume both of the following facts about these situations. 
 
1. In the greengrocer’s statement ‘It’s red’, and the artist’s statement ‘It’s not red’, ‘it’ referred to a red-
fleshed, green-skinned watermelon.  (That is, the uses of ‘it’ did not refer to some part of the watermelon 
but rather the whole thing.) 
2. The greengrocer’s statement ‘It’s red’, and the artist’s statement ‘It’s not red’ were both true. 
 
If these assumptions are right, then it seems that the word ‘red’ can change its extension across contexts.4  
Moreover the effect is dramatic enough not to be attributable to ordinary vagueness.  Many have regarded 
examples of this sort as raising a significant challenge for the project of truth-conditional semantics.    
                                                
3 Borrowed from Charles Travis, pc. 
4 We only says ‘seems’ since theoretically the extension of ‘red’ could simply 
include the watermelon at one time and exclude it at another time, even if it hasn’t 
changed color in any respect: think ‘grue’.  This possibility should not be taken 
seriously for two reasons: the first is that this extension would be bizarre, and the 
second is that we could rewrite our situations so that the two utterances occur at 
the same time (i.e. put the artist’s studio inside the greengrocer’s). 
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We will be focusing on the particular kind of context-sensitivity exhibited in the vignettes.  There are, of 
course, lots of different kinds of context-sensitive expressions, including indexicals, modals, light verbs, 
quantifiers, relational nouns, adverbs of quantification, and temporal expressions. We will give a semantics 
for a certain range of context-dependent predicates including ‘red’ and ‘hexagonal’.  We think that it’s 
possible that this treatment could be extended to treat gradable adjectives such as ‘tall’, but we’re not 
committed to that claim.5  Our semantics is not designed directly to account for all types of context 
dependence. And we are not committed to any particular views about the extent to which the ideas 
developed here might usefully be extended to other types of context dependence.  
 
1 Contextual variation and compositionality 
 
The kind of contextual variation of extension exhibited in the vignettes has been taken to present a prima-
facie challenge to traditional truth-conditional semantics.  Keble College, Oxford, is mainly built of reddish 
bricks.  The examples we gave above make it plausible to think that in one context an utterance of ‘Keble 
College is red’ is true whereas in another context, an utterance of that same sentence might be false--this 
without Keble College having changed color. This possibility, along with three other assumptions, leads us 
to contradiction.  One assumption, 2, is a weak compositionality principle. Another, 3, expresses 
commitment to the basic apparatus of traditional truth-conditional semantic theory. And the final 
                                                
5 See DeRose (forthcoming) and Hawthorne (forthcoming) for a discussions of 
gradable adjectives that indicates that they might fit well into the semantics we 
outline for ‘red’, which is a gradable adjective in some sense but not a canonical 
one like ‘tall’.  These papers respond to a number of arguments that Jason Stanley 
has given against the indexical views of gradable adjectives like ‘tall’, see in 
particular Stanley (2002).  
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assumption, 4, is that words like ‘red’ do not carry with them an indexical element that varies its extension 
across contexts.  The inconsistent quartet is as follows: 
 
1. ‘Keble College is red’ has different truth values in different contexts.  
2.  The semantic value of a complex expression is determined by its syntax together with the semantic 
values of its constituents.  
3. The semantic value of an expression is its extension. The extension of a sentence is a truth value.  
4. The extension of the components of ‘Keble College is red’ do not vary across contexts of utterance. 
 
There are a variety of possible responses to the problem raised by the inconsistency of 1 through 4.  
Probably the most popular response is what can be called the pragmatist response.  On this sort of line one 
denies assumption 2.  This response would probably be offered by a certain type of fan of the later work of 
Ludwig Wittgenstein, a fan who thinks that the whole project of formal semantics for natural language is 
misguided. It is also offered by some theorists who are not at all skeptical about the semantic project, but 
who think that context supplies determinants of truth conditions that are not shadowed anywhere in the 
syntax of the object language, for instance any discourse representation theorists.6 
 
Skeptics about formal semantics for natural language might or might not also wish to reject assumption 3.  
Non-skeptics might do so as well. They would accept 2, but deny that truth-conditional semantics is the way 
to go.  We believe that Travis, Chomsky (1977), and Paul Pietroski would adopt this position.  
 
                                                
6 See, for example, Barbara Partee’s (1989) proposal for treating relational nouns. 
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Another line of response, typically called ‘semantic minimalism’, is to deny assumption 1.  On this account, 
the truth-conditional semantic project is preserved, at the price of denying that sentences like ‘Keble College 
is red’ have different truth-conditions in different contexts.  Supporters of this view include Cappelen and 
Lepore (2005) and Borg (2004).  One problem with this view is that it rejects the idea that intuitions about 
the truth values of utterances of sentences provide good evidence about those sentences’ truth conditions. 
This makes it very hard to understand what the data for a semantic theory are supposed to be.7  In other 
words, it makes it very hard to see how one is supposed to tell whether a semantic account of some fragment 
of natural language is correct.  If it really is so hard to judge whether a semantic theory for a piece of natural 
language is correct, then the flourishing field of linguistic semantics is in real trouble.    
 
There is a less radical view that might amount to a rejection of 1.  This view would have it that the strict and 
literal meanings of words, like ‘red’, determine a single context-independent extension for the words. 
Calling the watermelon ‘red’ for instance is simply a non-literal use.  Red things (literally speaking) are 
things that are red on most of their visible surface.  We don’t know of any philosophers who explicitly hold 
this view in print (since Cappelen and Lepore (2005)  are silent about the extension of any term, their view 
appears to be compatible with this one).  This view seems to be a simple empirical bet.  If empirical studies 
(deficits, brain-imaging, patterns of acquisition or whatever) manage to isolate a core set of literal uses of 
words like ‘red’ and show that those uses are ones where there is no contextual variation, then this view may 
turn out to be correct.  As far as we know, there is, as of yet, no empirical evidence to suggest that the 
division between literal and non-literal uses would vindicate a denial of assumption 1. 
 
                                                
7 Of course, we don’t regard speakers’ intuitions as sacrosanct. But it is very 
reasonable to assume, as linguists generally do, that by and large, speakers’ 
judgements are a reasonably good guide to truth conditions. 
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Another set of views including our own view here and that of Szabó (2001) involves denying assumption 4.  
On these views, there are one or more indexical elements in ‘Keble College is red’ the extensions of which 
vary across contexts. Szabó’s view is that at logical form ‘red’ associates with two variables, which have 
their values contextually determined.  One of these picks out a comparison class, the other picks out the part 
of the object that has to be colored: ‘red(c, p)’.  
 
Our analysis, by contrast, treats ‘red’ itself as a simple indexical, like ‘I’ or ‘that’.  There are no variables 
associated with ‘red’.  It’s just a word that happens to change extension across contexts. 
 
2 Our Analysis 
 
According to the standard picture of context-sensitivity, only a small set of lexical items vary their extension 
across contexts of utterance.  These are the classic indexicals such as ‘I’, ‘here’, ‘now’, ‘that’, ‘he’, and 
‘this’.  These indexicals do not threaten the thesis of compositionality. It is just that semantic value varies 
from context to context (in other words, for these words, one denies an equivalent of assumption 4.) 
 
Our task here is to defend a view according to which the class of indexicals is expanded to include certain 
predicates, like ‘red’.  In this section, we give a formal proposal for handling this contextual variation. Our 
proposal is formulated as a T-theory.  This allows us to make clear exactly how one derives the truth 
conditions for the sentences we treat.  We could equally have defined a function that goes from sentences 
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and contexts to truth conditions.  It should be easy to see (in principle!) how one would expand the T-theory 
presented here to cover more extensive fragments of natural language.8 
 
Any adequate truth-conditional semantics requires a treatment of indexical elements.  One standard 
treatment is the conditionalized T-theory approach developed by Burge (1974), Weinstein (1974), and 
Larson and Segal (1995).  The basic idea is that the context-independent semantics provides the means to 
prove a T-theorem, given information about the extensions of expressions in specific contexts. Very 
roughly, the idea for, say, ‘that is remarkable’ is that the context-independent semantics allows one to derive 
a conditional along the lines of D: 
 
(D) If u is an utterance ‘that is remarkable’ and the speaker uses ‘that’ in u to refer to x, the u is true iff x 
satisfies ‘is remarkable’. 
 
Suppose that in a particular context, the speaker uses ‘that’ to refer to the Taj Majal. One can then go on to 
derive (T):9 
  
(T) u is true iff the Taj Majal is remarkable. 
 
We have adapted the basic idea behind the Burge/Weinstein sort of theory, so that it can apply to predicates. 
Our theory requires a rather complicated metaphysics of language. We group together all the tokens of an 
                                                
8 For outlines of compositional truth-conditional semantics for larger chunks of 
natural language see Larson and Segal (1995) or Heim and Kratzer (1998). 
9 As David Kaplan (1977/1989) pointed out, the context-independent semantics of 
indexical expression is a function from contexts to extensions, a ‘character’. The 
Burge and Weinstein treatments in effect show how to assign characters to 
indexicals in a T-theory, without actually talking about functions. 
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expression that occur within a given context: so, for example, if the customer says to the greengrocer ‘is that 
a red one?’ and the greengrocer says ‘yes, it is a red one’, we group together those two tokens of ‘red’. We 
treat the tokens of an indexical predicate that occur within the same context as tokens of a single syntactic 
type. No token of that type can occur in another context. We indicate the syntactic type by indexing. Thus 
all tokens of ‘red’ that occur in a given context receive the same index, as in: ‘redj’.10 We will use numbers 
to keep contexts and these context-bound expressions in line: thus all the ‘redj’s occur in the j-th context.11 
The context-bound expression types are subtypes of larger types, such as the one that includes all the ‘redj’s, 
‘redk’s etc.. We can think of this larger type as context-independent and possessed of a context-independent 
semantics. Its semantics, intuitively speaking, is given by a function from contexts to extensions. The 
semantics of each context-bound ‘redj’ is the extension it receives relative to its context. This extension is 
determined by the conversational standards of the context: an object satisfies a token of ‘redj’ in a context, if 
it counts as red by the standards of that context. These context-bound indexical predicates occur in 
sentences, and the sentences have truth conditions relative to the contexts in which they occur. Thus ‘It is 
redj’ uttered in the greengrocer’s context is true relative to that context iff the demonstrated melon is red by 
the standards of the context. We assume further that utterances of sentences containing context-bound 
indexicals have truth values. These are simply inherited from the truth value that the sentence uttered 
receives relative to its context. So the grocer’s utterance of ‘It is redj’ is true, absolutely, iff the sentence 
uttered is true relative to the context.  
                                                
10 ‘Context’ is here a slightly technical term. If it is possible for someone truly to 
say of a given object ‘Well, it is red, but it’s not red’, using ‘red’ in different 
senses, then we would represent this by something like this: ‘Well, it is redj, but 
it’s not redk’. Contexts are therefore fine-grained. We have no theory of contexts, 
but the key thing is that they must include the referential intentions of speakers. If 
someone insists on asking us what a context is, then we will say that it is an 
ordered pair of an utterance and the rest of the universe. 
11 Thanks to Jon Barton for this idea.  If you are fussy, then notice that numbers 
number contexts and indices, which latter are pieces of syntax. 
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The melon that we have been discussing is red by the standards of the greengrocer, but not by those of the 
artist’s studio. The context in which we have been discussing the melon is academia. We are writing a 
theoretical paper addressed primarily to other academics. It is the ‘red’ so-used that we need for the meta-
language.  Our conversational context is academia and we are discussing red in general, and not using ‘red’ 
to describe the colour of anything in particular. So we can appropriately label our context ‘g’, for ‘general’, 
and subscript ‘red’ appropriately: ‘redg’.12  
 
Here is the T-theory: 
 
Axioms 
(1)   (x)(n)(x satisfies ‘Keble College’, cn iff x=Keble College) 
(2) (x)(n)(x satisfies 'is red’^n, cn  iff x is redg, cn) 
(3)  (S)(NP)(VP) (If S = NP^VP, then  
 ((n)(S is true, cn iff (∃x)(x satisfies NP, cn and x satisfies VP, cn))) 
(4)   (u)(n)(S) (if u is an utterance of S in cn, then (u is true iff S is true, cn)) 
 
 
                                                
12 We have no very strong views about how ‘redg’ works in constructions like 
‘redg by the standards of context c’. But we do have a suggestion. We suggest that 
‘redg’ has a wide extension: things that are red by some standard or other. But we 
also suggest that the precise extension of ‘red’ (plus index) is irrelevant in this 
particular construction. In the greengrocer, someone might say ‘Yes, the melon is 
redj … although of course not by the standards of the artist’s studio’. Here it looks 
as though the implicit ‘red’ in the second sentence is ‘redj’. But the sentence 
means just the same as ‘not redg by the standards of the artist’s studio’. So it looks 
as though ‘by the standards of context c’ in effect works like a functor that maps 
any ‘redn’ extension onto things that are red by the standards of c. 
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Assume information about a particular context cj:  
 
(5)   uj is an utterance of Sj= ‘Keble College is redj’ in cj 
(6)        (x)(x is redg, cj iff x is redj)  
 
 
(To understand the occurrence of the meta-linguistic  ‘is redj’ on the right-hand side of 6 it is necessary to be 
in cj. All that is required for this is that one knows enough about the intentions of the speaker and so on to be 
able to use ‘red’ in the same way as the other participants.) We can now plug the contextual information into 
the context-independent T-theory, and derive a T-theorem, as follows:  
(7)   (x)(x satisfies ‘is redj’, cj iff  x is redg, cj)  
 [(2)]  
(8)   If Sj = ‘Keble College is redj’, then ((n)(Sj is true, cn iff  
 (∃x)(x satisfies ‘Keble College’, cn  and x satisfies ‘redj’, cn) 
 [(3)] 
(9)     Sj= ‘Keble College is redj’ 
 [(5)] 
(10)   (n)(Sj is true, cn  iff  
 (∃x)(x satisfies ‘Keble College’, cn and x satisfies ‘is redj’, cn ))  
 [(8) (9)] 
(11)   Sj is true, cj iff  
 (∃x)(x satisfies ‘Keble College’, cj and x satisfies ‘is redj’, cj) 
 [(10)] 
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(12)  Sj is true, cj iff (∃x)(x satisfies ‘Keble College’, cj  and x is redg,  cj) 
 [(11), (2)] 
(13)     Sj is true, cj iff (∃x)(x satisfies ‘Keble College’, cj and x is redj ) 
 [(12), (6)]  
(14)   Sj is true cj iff (∃x)(x=Keble College and x is redj) 
 [(13), (1), ] 
(15)  If uj is an utterance of Sj in cj, then (uj is true iff Sj is true, cj) 
 [(4)]  
(16) uj is true iff Sj is true, cj 
 [(5), (15)]  
(17)  uj is true  iff (∃x)(x=Keble College and x is redj)          
 [(14), (16)]  
 (18)  uj is true iff Keble College is redj      
 [(17)] 
 
It is worth noting that our analysis is similar to another, more pragmatic treatment, of ‘red’. On this 
treatment, ‘red’ has a constant, context-independent semantic value, which value gets enriched in a given 
context of utterance (see for instance, Recanati, 2003).  The newly enriched value then combines 
compositionally with the rest of elements in the sentence in the usual way.  This theory, unlike ours, gives a 
genuine role to pragmatic enrichment (rather than indexical resolution) in the determination of meaning.  On 
the other hand, the pragmatic enrichment plays the same formal role as the indexical resolution does in our 
T-theory, so there is little difference in the basic structure of the accounts.  We think that this account 
embodies the same basic idea as ours embedded in a different theoretical framework. 
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3 Prima-facie Virtues of Analysis 
 
One prima-facie virtue of our analysis is that it preserves both the truth-conditional compositionality of 
natural language and the idea that our intuitions about the truth conditions of utterances provide reliable data 
for a semantic theory.13  Pragmatism and minimalist semantics sacrifice one or both of these desiderata. We 
think we should only resort to such measures if forced to.   Ultimately we may need to relax these 
assumptions, but as long as good work is based on them, we should try to preserve them if possible.14 
 
Another virtue of our semantics is its combination of its simplicity and strength.  First of all, we do not posit 
intermediate levels of semantic representation between the output of semantic processing and the extension 
of an utterance.  In other words, we do not posit mechanisms that take sentence meaning along with the 
broad context as an input and give the truth-conditions of what was said as an output.15   
 
Secondly, we posit a relatively simple syntax, with only a little more structure than meets the eye.  In this 
respect our proposal is more economical than Szabó’s, who posits two hidden variables. Our proposal is as 
simple as a theory that posits just a single hidden variable referring to the context of utterance and serving as 
                                                
13 At least that such intuitions are reliable with respect to these sorts of predicate; 
there are types of construction where truth conditions that normal speakers 
associate with sentences must be explained in part by non-semantic processes, but 
it is good methodology keep these areas circumscribed and properly accounted 
for. 
14 Some philosophers might doubt that truth-conditional linguistic semantics is a 
flourishing field.  Since most people engaged in the project are linguists not 
philosophers, such doubt is understandable.  However, a look at the increasing 
number of articles, NSF grants, PhD theses, academic jobs, and so on in linguistic 
semantics might be taken as some evidence of the health of the field. 
15 Relevance theory (Sperber and Wilson, 1986) takes such a mechanism to be a 
critical part of our linguistic capacity separate from our semantic processing. 
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a catch-all covering a very wide range of contextual variations. Our proposal extends to many varieties of 
contextual variation in which language leaves it up to speakers to pin down an extension. There are many 
different kinds of case of this ilk. We will mention are just five forms of context-sensitivity that our theory 
might plausibly handle.  
 
Our proposal can handle the context-sensitivity of vague predicates with varying standards of precision such 
as ‘hexagonal’. It can handle the context-sensitivity of ‘knows’. It can handle an element of the context-
sensitivity of ‘tall’ that is not captured by a variable for comparison class: there is variability of how tall one 
has to be relative to a comparison class to satisfy an utterance of ‘tall’ (this point is from Fara 2000). It can 
handle Chomsky’s example of ‘water’. Water infused with tea leaves does not fall in the extension of most 
utterances of ‘water’. But if tea leaves were added to tap water at source as a purifier, then the tea-infused 
water coming from our taps would fall in the extension of ‘water’. Finally, our proposal can handle the 
‘forward’ that appears in ‘the meeting was moved forward an hour’, which can mean either that it took place 
an hour earlier than originally planned, or an hour later, depending on the speaker’s perspective.16 Our 
simple proposal thus covers a very wide range of data.  
 
We do not pretend that our semantics explains things it does not.  The semantics does not explain how, in a 
given context, a person determines what the extension of ‘red’ is, i.e. what it is to be red by the standards of 
the context.  On our account, this is an example of indexical resolution.  ‘Red’ is rather like ‘that’, in that it 
is a non-trivial task to explain how the term acquires an extension in a context.  Ultimately how we succeed 
in communicating with indexical expressions may not be a question which formal semantics itself has much 
to say about.  This is not to say we think that an account of this is either unimportant or easy to give. But it 
                                                
16 For an interesting discussion of this phenomenon, see Pinker (2007), 191.  
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is not part of semantic theory.  Our semantic proposal (like many other treatments of demonstratives and 
indexicals) isolates this complex area from formal semantics. 
 
In sections 4 and 5 we consider how our proposals compares to Szabo's in relation to some specific pieces of 
data. In section 6 we consider some conceptual issues arising. In section 7 we offer a tentative sketch of a 
taxonomy of different kinds of context-sensitive expressions. 
 
4 Binding Considerations 
 
The recent literature in philosophy of language is strewn with controversy over the issue of binding and its 
relation to the semantics/pragmatics distinction.17 As in first-order logic, a bound variable in natural 
language is a variable bound by another expression.  Linguistics provides many examples where certain 
expressions, most notably pronouns, behave like bound variables: 
(1) Every man likes his mother.  
On one reading of (1), it is clear here that ‘his’ functions as if it were a variable bound by the 
quantificational expression ‘every man’.  So a pre-theoretic way of writing out the logical form of (1) would 
be (2): 
(2).  For every man x ,  x likes x’s mother.  
In this case, there are two bound variables in (1).18 In addition to bound uses, third person pronouns also 
exhibit free uses: 
                                                
17 See for instance Stanley and Szabó (2000), Stanley (2002), Neale 
(forthcoming). 
18 Of course, quantifiers may be treated in a variety of possible ways in different 
semantic theories, our treatment here is just mimicking first-order logic for ease 
of understanding. 
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(3) He was a good man.  
In examples like (3) we generally interpret ‘he’ as referring to some contextually salient male individual.   
This use of third-person pronouns is sometimes called a ‘deictic’ or ‘indexical’ use since it resembles the 
use of indexicals like ‘that’ and ‘you’. 
 
The exact treatment of bound and unbound pronouns and their relation to each other is a question of 
considerable controversy within syntax and semantics. Whether a unified account can be given or not, work 
needs to be done.19  
 
There is one important point to note here: a simple indexical semantics for ‘he’ cannot account for its bound 
use.  It is easy to see this: on the simple indexical semantics ‘he’ simply refers to some contextually salient 
individual.  But there is no contextually salient individual which, if taken as the value for ‘his’, in (1)  would 
give us a bound reading.  The point is simple and has been made before many times: the standard semantics 
for indexicals does not allow indexicals to act like bound variables (Evans, 1977, Heim and Kratzer, 1995, 
ch. 9). 
 
In this paper we give a simple indexical semantics for predicates like ‘red’ and ‘hexagonal’.  If these 
predicates exhibit something analogous to the bound usages we find in (1) then our semantics will not be 
able to account for that.20 
                                                
19 The first steps towards a unified account were made in the early eighties by 
Heim (1982) and Kamp (1981).  There is still considerable debate over the 
success of these ‘dynamic’ approaches to meaning. 
20 What conclusion we should draw from the presence of bound uses is hard to 
say: the point is one needs to account for them somehow.  There are really two 
options, bring them into the semantics or describe a pragmatic mechanism that 
can deliver the right readings.  Many have read Stanley (2002) as claiming that 
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This leaves us with the following questions: what sort of ‘bound’ behavior might our predicates exhibit that 
we would be unable to account for?  There are really two different possibilities here.  One is that, like ‘he’, 
our predicate itself acts like a bound variable relative to some quantifier (presumably a quantifier of colors).   
The other is that our predicate acts like it contains a bound variable, even if it itself is not one.  An example 
of the latter sort of behavior is provided by the noun phrase ‘enemy’:21  
(4) Every man faced an enemy.  
This sentence has a reading under which it means that for every man x, x faced x’s enemy, not just an enemy 
of someone or other.  In that respect, the sentence behaves as if it has a bound reading.  We will call this 
kind of binding implicit argument binding to reflect the fact that what appears to be bound is not the 
expression itself but some implicit argument.22  In these accounts, what is bound is not so much an implicit 
argument but either a situation variable or a different pronoun that is pragmatically supplied to fill out a 
definite description which replaces the original pronoun. 
 
Let us address the possibility of direct binding of ‘red’ first.  On our view, ‘red’ is an indexical expression 
that picks out predicate extensions.  Naturally these extensions tend to include just red things.   By way of 
contrast, in its unbound use, ‘he’ is an indexical expression that tends to refer to male individuals.  But the 
pronoun can also be bound by a quantifier quantifying over male individuals.   
 
                                                                                                                                
the latter option is not possible.  Such a claim cannot be right: it might for some 
reason be undesirable to posit pragmatics mechanisms that deliver bound readings 
where the syntax has no binding, but it is not theoretically impossible.  For 
discussion see Recanati (2003) and Neale (forthcoming). 
21 This example is from Partee (1989). 
22 Note, as pointed out by Neale (2004), that a version of implicit argument 
binding is used by almost all non-dynamic approaches to donkey anaphora, e.g. 
Heim (1990) and Neale (1990). 
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We will argue that there is no reason to think ‘red’ exhibits the same type of direct binding that ‘he’ does.  
Here are two examples with ‘red’ in a position where it might be bound by quantifiers over shades of red, 
each example is paired with a structurally similar example of real binding with pronouns.  (The index i 
shows where the binding is meant to take place.) 
(5)  a. Every shade of redi is such that there is a house that is redi.  
b. Every mani is such that someone hit himi.  
(6)  a. Every shade of redi was used to paint a house redi.  
b. Every mani was hisi own best friend.  
In (5a) the second use of ‘red’ is clearly in a position to be bound by the quantifier ‘every shade of red’.  
However, (5a) does not exhibit the bound reading according to which for each shade x of red, there is a 
house that is shade x.23 On the other hand in (5b) the bound reading is clearly available for the pronoun 
‘him’ in a similar syntactic configuration.  Likewise (6a) does not seem to have a reading on which the 
second use of ‘red’ is bound by the quantifier, under which it would mean that every shade of red x was 
used to paint a house shade x.  (Compare (6b)) 
 
We should not be surprised that ‘red’ does not exhibit directly bound readings. There are very few kinds of 
expressions that can be directly bound by quantifiers.  It would have been a surprising syntactic/semantic 
discovery if ‘red’ could be directly bound. 
 
                                                
23 Perhaps ‘every shade of red’ is somehow not the right quantifier phrase, 
however, we could not find any that work.  We do not discount the possibility that 
the problem is that a nominal quantifier cannot bind something that’s 
grammatically an adjective.  The problem is that any non-nominal quantifiers 
(like ‘everywhere’) are also modifiers, and using modifiers to give evidence of 
binding faces serious problems, as we argue below. 
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This leaves us with the question of whether ‘red’ exhibits implicit argument binding.   Recall that implicit 
argument binding occurs where an expression contains an unpronounced argument that is bound by a 
quantifier (or anyway shows behavior that would naturally be analyzed in this manner).  Szabó gives us 
somewhere to search.  Recall that he proposed that two variables associate with ‘red’: a location variable (p) 
and a comparison class variable (c).  So ‘red’ looks like ‘red(c)(p)’.  First, let us concentrate on the location 
variable, ‘p’.   Szabó himself says next to nothing about the nature of these variables, so we cannot be sure 
whether or not he would expect these variables tobe bindable. 
 
All we can do is look at the facts.  It is hard to get an example where a bound reading of the hypothetical 
location variable would appear likely.  Imagine, for instance, that one has a cube that has a small sentence 
written on each face describing the face’s colour.  Please consider:  
(7) Each facei says the cube is red(c)(pi). 
(8)  Each mani says that John hit himi. 
On its bound reading, (7) would mean that each face says that the cube is red on that face.  We cannot get 
this reading, nor can we find any other clear examples where it looks like a location variable is bound.  As 
(8) indicates ‘red’ seems to be in the right syntactic position to be bound in (7).24 
  
There is another possible method of binding that needs to be considered.  This is binding that occurs when a 
modifier is introduced, i.e. some sort of adjunct that includes a quantifier.  Here is an example: 
(9) The field is brown in many places.  
Now it is certainly true that, in some sense, (9) is only saying that the field is brown in the places being 
quantified over by ‘many places.’  However, this does not show that there is a bindable element in the 
                                                
24 This is far from certain, however, as direct objects and predicates might not 
really be in the same syntactic position. 
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predicate ‘is brown.’  For we can understand ‘in many places’ as a modifier which takes something of 
semantic type <e,t>  (i.e. ‘is brown’) and returns something of semantic type <e,t>.   In doing so it may add 
into the logical form the element which is bound by the quantifier, so there is no need to suppose that a 
bindable element was already there. In other words, there is no reason to suppose that the logical form (9) is 
structurally like (10) rather than (11):  
(10) many places (x), the field is brown(x) . 
(11) many places (x), the field is (brown in x). 
Indeed, there is a good reason to understand (9) as having an LF more like (10) than (11).   Even when we 
have quantified over locations there is still a possibility of contextual variation in terms of location of 
coloring.  For instance, (9) could mean in some contexts that  the ground is brown in many places.  In other 
contexts it could mean that the plants are brown in many places.  But if we treated the locational variation as 
a case of actual binding, this extra variation would be left unaccounted for. 
 
It’s worth noting that exactly similar considerations invalidate a naive version of the well-known ‘binding 
argument’ presented by Jason Stanley (2002) with respect to the sentence ‘it’s raining.’   This naive 
reconstruction of the argument (which Stanley did not put forward) notes first that the locational variation in 
‘it’s raining’ suggests the presence of a bound variable: 
(12) Everywhere I go, it rains.  
Now the argument goes on to conclude that because a variable was bound in (12), there must be a locational 
variable all occurrences ‘it rains’.  The joke is, of course, that ‘everywhere’ is not simply a plain quantifier 
over locations, it’s also, grammatically speaking a modifier.  Moreover whatever ‘binding’ it accomplishes 
is not sufficient to capture all the contextual variation over location.  For we could imagine that the locations 
it quantifies over are too coarse-grained to capture the actual locations of rain: 
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(13) In every country I go to, it rains. 
It is entirely possible that (13) could be false even though on a trip during which I went to Spain, Germany 
and Italy, it rained somewhere in each of those countries while I was there (but that it didn’t rain where I 
was).  What this indicates is that whatever binding is happening, it is not simply a matter of the noun phrase 
‘every country’ directly binding the sole location variable in ‘it rains’.25 
 
So much for location-variables being implicated in implicit argument binding. The second variable that 
Szabó posits is one for implicit comparison classes (following Ludlow, 1989).  Implicit comparison classes 
are classes of items that provide standards for what shades are red enough to counts as ‘red’.  So being red 
for an apple is different from being red for a sunburned face, though in both cases it is just the surface that is 
colored.   An apple that is as red as a typical sunburned face might be called ‘pink’ instead of ‘red’.  
 
Of course, one can use a modifier to ‘bind’ a comparison class variable.  One can say, for instance, that 
every boy bought an object that was red by comparison to the other objects in his house or for its kind. 
However, in these cases the binding is introduced by a modifier, and this is compatible with our semantic 
proposal for ‘red’.  What about cases without modifiers?  It does not suffice merely to cite sentences like 
this: 
(14) Every kind of animal in the zoo has a member that is red. 
One can imagine a situation in which being red for a squirrel, say, is different from being red for a goldfish.  
However, one extension of ‘red’ may still do the work here: it just needs to pick out canonically red 
                                                
25 Stanley’s actual example was more complex: 
(i) Every time John lights a cigarette it rains.  
One puzzle here is that what seems like a temporal modifier acts also like a 
locational modifier---suggesting that tense might also encode locations.  Perhaps 
this is because ”"every time” quantifies over situations rather than just times. 
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squirrels and goldfish.26 One can try to construct an example for which one extension of ‘red’ will not be 
adequate.  For instance: 
(15) Only one collection of fruit was next to exactly one red color tile.  
It would be interesting if this could mean something like this: 
(16) Only one collection of fruiti was next to exactly one red(ci)(p) color tile.  
Evaluate (15) in the following scenario. There are two collections of fruit between which is a color tile that 
counts as red with respect to only one of them. No other color tiles are nearby.  If (15) was interpreted like 
(16), then it would be true in the scenario. But it seems impossible to get this true reading.   So, at least on a 
preliminary examination, there is no compelling evidence that there is a bindable comparison class variable 
in ‘red’. 
 
Another possibility, departing from Szabó’s proposal, is that ‘red’ has a situational variable and so can be 
dependent on quantification over situations or contexts.  The idea here is that each context or situation 
provides standards for what counts as red (perhaps by making salient some group of individuals).  So, on 
this proposal ‘red’ itself simply has a bindable situation variable.  Here the data are more equivocal.27 
                                                
26 Zoltan Szabó (p.c.) notes that our proposal might make bad predictions if we 
assume something like the following, plausible principle: 
Color Constancy If two objects are the same shade of color in 
some context C, then if one of them is red by the standards of C, so 
is the other. 
The problem is brought out by a case where there are no canonically red goldfish 
but there are still some goldfish that are the same shade of red as, say, a red 
squirrel is.  It seems like in this circumstance (14) might be false.  Our response is 
to reject Color Constancy.  In a given context, one extension of ‘red’ will include 
certain sunburns as red while not including identically colored color-tiles.  See 
DeRose (forthcoming) and Hawthorn (forthcoming) for a similar discussion of 
‘tall’. 
27 In small sample email surveys we conducted on these sorts of examples we 
found considerable variation and there were differences of opinion on many of the 
examples even between the two of us. 
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Let us consider a variation of our earlier example with the artist and the greengrocer. 
The Artist and the Greengrocer 
Suppose that are two situations: the greengrocer and the artist’s studio.  In the artist’s studio there is 
a beautiful red apple and a red watermelon (red on the inside).  In the greengrocer the situation is 
different.  The greengrocer has six watermelons, five of which are yellow (on the inside) and one of 
which is red (on the inside).  A customer comes in and asks for a red watermelon and the 
greengrocer points to the requisite item.  Assume this particularly under-stocked greengrocer has no 
other fruit. 
Here is a hypothetical sentence for describing these situations. 
(17) In each situation there was exactly one red piece of fruit.   
It would seem that (17) could only be true if each situation has different standards of redness.  The key point 
is that one loose sense of ‘red’ will not do since on this sense a red-fleshed grapefruit is either red or not red.  
But if ‘red’ only has one extension in (17) then (17) will have to be false.  So to make (17) true we need the 
grapefruit to count as red in the greengrocer but not to count as red in the artist’s studio. This suggests that 
the logical form of (17) might be something like (18): 
(18) In each situation s there was exactly one red(s) piece of fruit. 
In a small email survey we found that some people found it natural to interpret sentences like (19) in such a 
way that they come out true in the scenario described.  Others did not.   
 
For a similar example with ‘hexagonal’ we found that even fewer people found the equivalent of  (19) 
acceptable.   The example goes as follows: 
The Hexagon Scenario 
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Many agree that when we talk about geography, a map of France counts as hexagonal. When we talk 
about architecture or geometry, only something that’s closer to a perfect hexagon counts. Suppose 
that in the architecture classroom there is a map of France and an accurate drawing of a hexagon 
hanging on the wall, and in the geography classroom there’s a map of the UK and a map of France 
hanging on the wall, and in the geometry classroom there is just a drawing of an as-near-as-possibly 
perfect hexagon hanging on the wall. 
The sentence we used to test whether ‘hexagonal’ could have a bound context variable was this: 
(19) In each classroom, there was exactly one hexagonal shape hanging on the wall. 
We found that most people could not get a true reading of (19) in the situation described. 
 
Turning back to ‘red’, even though some people found (17) acceptable, this might not mean that ‘red’ really 
exhibits bound uses.  For one possibility is that those individuals were using a meta-linguistic sense of ‘red’.  
In other words they interpreted (17) as meaning that in each situation exactly one piece of fruit was ‘red’ (in 
the sense that it could be called ‘red’ in that situation).28 
 
Our purpose here is not to establish definitely that ‘red’ does not exhibit bound uses---that would take more 
careful empirical study.  All we hope to have done is to establish the plausibility of the claim.   The point is 
that the evidence of bound readings for ‘red’ is weak compared to the evidence of bound readings for words 
like ‘enemy’ or for quantifier domain restrictions (Stanley and Szabó, 2000).   The only plausible candidate 
for binding we found was in ‘situation’ type examples.   But many people found even these unacceptable. 
And it is reasonable to account for the judgements of those that did find them acceptable by appeal to meta-
linguistic readings. Or, to suggest another possibility, we might hypothesize that they were using an 
                                                
28 See Horn (1989) for arguments for the presence of unobvious meta-linguistic 
readings in ordinary speech. 
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expanded ‘philosopher’s English’ that over-extends the principle of charity---since many of the people 
surveyed were philosophers.  So we will assume that it is plausible that ‘red’ does not introduce a bindable 
element.  Even if this is wrong, we can still propose our semantics for other predicates (such as, possibly, 
‘hexagonal’) which don’t give any indication of binding.  
 
If there is no binding phenomenon with ‘red’ or ‘hexagonal’ this does not itself show that our indexical 
semantics for these terms is correct, or that Szabó’s is incorrect.  Nonetheless if it is true, it adds to the 
tenability of our proposal by showing that we do not need a more complex semantics for ‘red’ in ordered to 
handle any bound readings (as is needed for ‘he’, ‘she,’ and ‘it’).  
 
4 Loose Extensions 
 
Recall that our semantics differs from Szabó’s in that rather than positing indexical variables in the syntax 
introduced along with the predicate ‘red’ we treat ‘red’ itself as an indexical.   We argued that our account is  
both more parsimonious and more powerful than Szabó’s and thus, all else equal, should be preferred.   
 
However, we also think that there are empirical considerations that bear against Szabó’s account.   We 
argued in the previous section that sometimes ‘red’ in a given context can have as it meaning a loose 
extension that includes a number of things which are red in different ways (e.g. by being red in different 
locations, etc).  We will make two arguments here: 1) that there is direct evidence for such loose extensions 
and 2) that Szabo’s account cannot handle them.  We will also relate these considerations to recent 
discussions of comparative adjectives, such as ‘tall’. 
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First of all, evidence for loose extensions. Consider this situation: 
The Orange and the Apple 
A man is at the greengrocer’s where various fruit, including blood oranges with red flesh and 
normal, red apples, are displayed uncut. He says to the greengrocer, ‘I want red fruit for my dinner 
party, I think red fruits are tastier, and they go better with my tablecloth.’ 
In this situation, the use of red in ‘red fruits’ can clearly stretch to include both fruits that are red on the 
inside and fruits that are red on the outside, in this context both the blood orange and the apples.  If there is 
doubt on whether these loose readings really occur we note that one can also say, in many contexts, (20). 
(20) The apple is more red than the blood orange. 
There is clearly a reading of (20) that means that the apple is more red on its surface than the blood orange 
is in its flesh.  But to have this reading the relevant sense of ‘red’ involved needs to be one that covers two 
different locations.29 
 
Can Szabó’s account handle these loose extensions of ‘red’?  That is actually not an easy question to 
answer.  The basic issue is whether there is a single value for the location variable associated with ‘red’ 
which can cover redness on the surface of some fruit but on the inside of others.  Clearly the variable cannot 
have as a value something like “an arbitrary part”, since that is not a possible value for a variable.  
Moreover, merely existentially quantifying the variable will not give the desired result, since the whole 
point is that it is not clear that there is one “location” that covers both areas. 
 
An anonymous reviewer suggested (in a slightly different context) that the variable might function like an 
‘e-type description’ (See Evans  1977,  Neale 1990).  Pronouns, after all, sometimes have e-type semantics, 
                                                
29 Thanks to Chris Kennedy for this suggestion.  Similar data can be found with 
ellipsis. 
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and since hidden variables are taken to be analogous to pronouns we might think that Szabó’s variable could 
work that way.  Consider this pair of sentences: 
(21) Susan has a son. Mary talked to him. 
Many theories of pronouns take “him” in the second sentence to spell out at some level of analysis as a 
definite description of the form “the son Susan has”.  Likewise one might think that the variable in the use 
of ‘red’ in The Orange and The Apple scenario is really a description of some sort.  In this case we would 
need to find a definite description that covers both the inside of the blood orange and the outside of the 
apple.  The problem with this idea is that e-type uses of descriptions invariable require explicit linguistic 
antecedents (as in “a son” in (21)).  But in our example there is no such antecedent. 
 
So it is simply not clear what the value of the location variable is in The Orange and the Apple scenario.  
This does not prove that Szabo’s account cannot handle these cases, but it shows that there is a significant 
problem in doing so.  Indeed it shows that there is a general lacuna in Szabo’s theory in that it does not 
make clear what range of values the location variable can have.   On our account, by contrast there is no 
problem in handling this case.  We just assume that in this case the particular utterance of ‘red’ in the 
context expressed a loose extension that covers both the apples and the oranges, an extension similar to that 
of the expression ‘red on some prominent part’. 
 
It’s worth noting that a similar observation has been made with respect to contextual variance in scalar 
adjectives by Klein (1980) (see also Ludlow (1989)).   The relevant data are very clear.  Suppose there are 
two children, John a four-year-old and Jenny a fourteen-year-old.  One can say of them: 
(22) John is tall and Jenny is too.  
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It is important to note that when there is syntactic ellipsis of this sort, it is generally accepted that the elided 
material must be semantically identical to the unelided material, so that the elided use of ‘tall’ in the second 
conjunct of (22) must have exactly the same semantic value as the use of  ‘tall’ in the first conjunct.   
 
If there were simply a free comparison-class variable in the use of ‘tall’ in (22) then we would expect (22) to 
mean that John is tall for a four-year-old and Jenny is tall for a four-year-old also (or that they are both tall 
for fourteen-year-olds).  However, the most natural meaning of (22) is not this one but rather one which says 
that each is tall for their own age group.  Our indexical semantics for ‘red’ if applied to ‘tall’ can capture 
this reading: it just requires picking an extension of tall that includes all members who are tall for their age 
group (and, perhaps, gender). 
 
Note, however, that ellipsis is not necessary to show this point.  In appropriate contexts we can find uses of 
‘tall’ that pick out tall members of different kinds.   
(23) Children who are tall are generally well nourished.  
The variable-heavy view of tall (Ludlow 1989, Stanley 2002, 2005) assumes that tall contains a comparison 
class variable, ‘c’, and that the meaning of ‘tall(c)’ is essentially tall for things of class c, which yields 
(vagueness aside) an extension consisting of a set of things higher than a standard determined relative norms 
for class c. If this is the semantics of ‘tall’ however, then (23) can only have a reading on which children 
above some set height are well nourished.  This is clearly not the intended reading of (23), the intended 
reading is that children who are tall for their age are well-nourished. 
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Both Ludlow and Stanley30 have gone to considerable lengths to defend their theories against the problem 
Klein posed with ellipsis.31  However, it should be clear that no simple modification of their accounts can 
handle cases of loose extensions without ellipsis, such as that involved in (23).  This is because on their 
accounts any given use of ‘tall’ picks out all and only entities above some contextually set height (where the 
contextually set height is determined by which group is in question).32  But sentences like (23) show that this 
cannot be the case—for on the standard reading ‘tall’ picks out all 10-year olds above some height but not 
all 15-year olds above the same height (see DeRose forthcoming, for a similar discussion). 33  
                                                
30 Stanley gives an account of ‘tall’ that is similar to Ludlow’s except that instead 
of just having a comparison class variable, there is both a functional variable and 
an objectual variable as its argument which together yield a comparison class. 
31 The basic idea of both their responses to the problem of ellipsis is to propose 
that a variable in ‘tall’ is bound by something outside the ellipsis.  It is know that 
bound variables can be elided and thus have different values in ellipsis as in this 
example:  
(ii) John talked to his shrink and Bill did too. 
The bound, or ‘sloppy’ reading is the one on which John and Bill each talked to 
their respective shrinks.   
32We have some hesitation here. Stanley posits variables associated with ‘tall’ 
without giving an explicit semantics for ‘tall’ (not even a toy semantics).  In any 
event, we assume based on his writing that this is the type of semantics he has in 
mind.  In Ludlow’s case this is what we understand him to mean by his meta-
language expression “x is tall for a y” (1989, p. 532), but he does not go into detail 
on this point. 
33 Stanley (2005) gives an interesting objection to the indexical semantics for ‘tall’ 
(his actual example uses ‘old’ but the point works for ‘tall’ also). He argues that 
one extension for ‘tall’ is not always sufficient to capture bound readings such as: 
(iii) Every sports team has exactly one tall member. 
The problem he suggests is that some people can play two different sports and be 
tall for one of them but not the other (e.g. Bo Jackson).  Perhaps such examples 
show that a purely indexical semantics is undesirable for ‘tall.’  However, we 
have some doubts.  It may be rather that it is not truly individuals in the usual 
sense that satisfy the extension of ‘tall’ but rather (something like) individuals 
under guises.  So for instance, the following sentence might be true: 
(iv) Bill Clinton, the president, was great, Bill Clinton, the husband, wasn’t.   
The interesting thing about this example is that the elided adjective has no 
obvious possible differing objects to bind it but nonetheless changes 
interpretation. This suggest that the proper satisfiers of some adjectives are not 
individuals in the usual sense.  If this is correct, then an indexical semantics can 
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This indicates that our indexical semantics has an empirical virtue over variable-based accounts of context 
sensitivity for both ‘tall’ and red’.34 
 
5 Conceptual Issues 
 
The empirical considerations we just went through about binding and ellipsis do not themselves make the 
case for our analysis.  Their purpose was simply to show that our analysis was tenable and empirically 
preferable to Szabó’s similar analysis.   The main argument in favor of our analysis is its simplicity and its 
compatibility with the aims and methodology of truth-conditional, compositional linguistic semantic 
research---aims and methodology which we think should only be abandoned for good reasons.    
 
A typical response to our sort of proposal is to argue that our treatment of ‘red’ as an indexical is 
undesirable on, roughly speaking, conceptual grounds.   Since basically conceptual grounds motivate our 
approach we need to be able to respond to this charge. 
 
The most prevalent argument against our kind of proposal is the claim that ‘red’ does not feel like an 
indexical.  Perhaps the mildest and most cautious complaint along these lines comes from Travis (1997) 
who writes:  
                                                                                                                                
survive Stanley’s objection. We want to stay neutral, however, on the question of 
whether an indexical semantics is appropriate for ‘tall’ as well as ‘red’.  As Chris 
Kennedy pointed out to us, the same point can be made using comparatives: 
(v) Bill Clinton, the president was better, than Bill Clinton, the husband. 
For some supporting observations about this topic see Hawthorne (forthcoming). 
34 See DeRose (forthcoming) and Segal (forthcoming) for further objections to 
hidden-variable accounts.  
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There are several respects in which the present phenomena are unlike central cases where the 
parameters approach seems promising. One difference is this. In the central cases, such as ‘I’ and 
‘now’, pointing to given parameters seems to be part of the terms meaning what they do….  By 
contrast, it is not part of what ‘green’ means, so far as we can tell, that speakings of it speak of, or 
refer to, such-and-such parameters. If its contribution, on a speaking, to what is said is a function of 
some parameters – say, implausibly, the speaker’s intentions – saying so is not part of what ‘green’ 
means. The parameter approach does not automatically suggest itself as it did with ‘I’.  
One might say same thing about treating ‘the’ as a quantifier: 
There are several respects in which the present phenomena are unlike central cases where the 
quantifier approach seems promising. One difference is this. In the central cases, such as ‘all’ and 
‘some’, expressing generality seems to be part of the terms meaning what they do…. By contrast, it 
is not part of what ‘the’ means, so far as we can tell, that speakings of it speak generally. If its 
contribution, on a speaking, to what is said is to express generality saying so is not part of what ‘the’ 
means. The quantifier approach does not automatically suggest itself as it did with ‘all’.  
We concede that neither account automatically suggests itself. We concede, too, that maybe the claims of 
semantic theorists about ‘green’ and ‘the’ do not conform to prima facie intuitions about what ‘seems to be 
part of the terms meaning what they do’. But such shallow seemings provide no real evidence against 
independently-motivated semantic theories.35  
 
Neale (forthcoming) is more outspoken. He claims that a key feature of indexicals is their perspectival 
nature: 
                                                
35 This is not to say that the quantificational approach to definite descriptions is 
correct.   Only that our pre-theoretical intuitions do not provide very good 
evidence for or against it. 
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I am strongly inclined to think that indexical words are essentially perspectival, that perspective is 
the hallmark of indexicality. (p. 336) 
… We should be skeptical about any claim to the effect that an expression (phonic or aphonic) is 
indexical if the expression is not perspectival in some way.  This is one reason I am deeply skeptical 
about “contextualist” accounts of the meaning of ‘know’.  The idea that this verb is indexical in 
some way makes a mockery of the idea of indexical expressions. (p. 337) 
Neale argues at length that every syntactically real context-sensitive term gives perspectival information.  
For instance, words such as ‘this’, ‘I’, ‘you’, ‘here’, ‘now’ all contain some sort of implicit reference to the 
perspective of the given speech act that they appear in.   
 
 We think that as an empirical matter Neale’s claim is dubious.  The fact is that many expressions whose 
semantics is obviously not constant such as ‘he’ and ‘it’ do not seem to have anything perspectival about 
them (perhaps explaining why they can be bound by quantifiers).  Anticipating this thought, Neale argues 
that such third-person pronouns indicate that the referent is neither the speaker or the hearer, which thereby 
gives them perspectival content.  However, this kind of perspectival nature is presumably not essential to the 
semantics of the pronouns but probably just arises from their competition with other forms that do have a 
perspectival nature. That this is the case is indicated by the fact that one can, if awkwardly, speak truly 
about oneself or a conversational partner in the third person, however one cannot speak truly about someone 
else using the first person.   For example, one person, say Tom, can use (24) to make a (potentially) true 
predication of himself, whereas Tom cannot use (25) to speak about another person, Jerry: 
(24) Tom, he’s a Jet.  
(25) Jerry, I’m a Jet.  
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Further evidence for this (suggested by an anonymous reviewer), comes from the fact that when the identity 
of a the referent a pronoun is unknown the third person is always used: 
(26) (talking about a boy in a family photograph) He must be either me or my brother.36 
Indeed it is a rather standard idea in the linguistics literature that, with regard to both person and gender, 
“he” is an unmarked pronoun (e.g., Sauerland, forthcoming). 
 
Even if we accept that standard indexical forms encode perspective that would by no means show that 
words like ‘red’ cannot be indexicals.  For it is not clear why positing that a form is indexical needs to be 
backed up by an explanation of their indexicality.  It is rather a piece of accepted data that words like ‘red’ 
are used to do different things in different contexts.  Giving these words an indexical semantics is a way of 
handling the data within a truth-conditional semantic theory.  It does not seem that any further motivation or 
explanation for this move is necessary.  There is no reason to think a constant (non-indexical) semantics 
should be the default--choosing a constant semantics is as much of a theoretical move as choosing an 
indexical semantics is.  Rather, like every other semantic proposal, our account must compete against other 
proposals.  There is no obvious sense in which our account is deficient because the use of an indexical 
treatment was unmotivated by any perspectival features. 
 
Szabó (2001) suggests a rather different argument for rejecting a proposal on which color-adjectives are 
treated as simple indexicals.  He writes: 
                                                
36 Another possible example of unmarked forms in natural language occurs with 
number.  Plural marking is often taken  to be the unmarked form of number.  This 
explains why (vi) does not mean the same as (vii). 
(vi) There are no baseballs.  
(vii) There aren’t more than one baseballs.  
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If ‘green’ were an indexical like ‘I’, we would expect the dictionary to contain an informative 
clause which tells us how to select its content in a given occasion of its use. If ‘green’ is context-
dependent, its context-dependence is of a different kind. 
One way of understanding this passage is to take it as meaning that any indexical word (i.e. word whose 
meaning is context-dependent) requires a recipe for understanding how its extension varies.37  Now it is 
obviously true that for ‘I’ a very simple rule that generally holds: any use of ‘I’ refers to the producer of the 
utterance it appears in.  However, the rule is less simple with ‘that’ and ‘he’.  A word like ‘he’ does not even 
need to pick out demonstrated individuals, or even always the most salient individual.  Likewise one cannot 
easily phrase a simple rule for what ‘that’ picks out.  If one tries, the suggested rule has little explanatory 
power.  Here is an example: 
[‘That’-rule] ‘that’ picks out the object demonstrated by the speaker.   
A rule of this ilk is clearly going to be very weak.  For demonstration can happen in countless different 
ways.  Obviously formulating a rule with any predictive power will be very hard. 
 
Different context-sensitive expressions work in different ways.  These differences do not show, however, 
that a large class of these expressions are not, in their semantic hearts, all indexicals.  Clearly different 
indexicals must encode different, looser or tighter, lexical constraints on what they can pick out.  But there 
is no motivation for saying that the constraints must be perspectival (as Neale does) or that they must be 
easily codifiable in a rule of some sort. 
 
                                                
37 Szabó (p.c.) explained to us that in this passage he actually only meant to prove 
that ‘red’ is not an indexical in the narrow sense, like ‘I’,  ‘you’, and ‘here’, not 
that ‘red’ is not a context sensitive expression (or indexical in the broad sense).  
We thought it worth keeping this discussion since the way we interpret his 
argument seems to be similar to thoughts others have on this matter. 
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Szabó and Neale at least try to identify features that some indexicals share and argue that lexical items not 
containing those features are not indexicals.  A more common attitude is simply to produce a short list of 
recognized indexical terms, ‘that’, ‘I’, ‘you’…, and say that anything not on that list is not an indexical.   
The argument, if there is one, tends to be that since speakers only intuitively recognize the small list of 
indexicals to be context-sensitive then we should only treat that list as indexicals.  Our reply is that 
speakers’ meta-linguistic intuitions (even as reflected by their uses of indirect discourse, as discussed in 
Cappelen and LePore, 2005) are simply not an adequate guide to what the shape of natural language 
semantics really is.   
 
The case for this point is not hard to make.  There are many abstract syntactic/semantic properties that 
clearly are relevant to syntactic/semantic processing that ordinary speakers have no conscious grasp of. An 
obvious example is downward-entailingness (Fauconnier, 1975, Ladusaw, 1979).   Downward-entailingness 
was ‘discovered’ through semantic research to be relevant for the licensing of negative polarity items, 
expressions like ‘any’ and ‘ever’.  But even though it took researchers some time to identify the property, it 
is clear that implicitly we must be sensitive to it, as native speakers are easily able to judge whether a use of 
negative polarity item is felicitous or not.  Anyone working in syntax and semantics must recognize that folk 
theories of semantics do not constrain real theories.  The fact that ‘red’ does not appear in the canonical list 
of indexicals is no reason not to treat it as one. 
 
6 A Taxonomy of Context Sensitivity 
 
We’ll close with a tentative consideration of the taxonomy of context-sensitive expressions.  There are, at 
least, two types of context-sensitive expressions: those like pronouns and tense which can be bound by other 
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operators and those such as ‘I’ and ‘now’ and ‘red’ (on the current proposal) which always have their 
extension determined by the context of the speech act.  This simple, dichotomous picture is essentially the 
one that Stanley (2002) gives.   
My own view of the truth-conditional role of context is very conservative. First, there are 
expressions which are obviously indexicals in the narrow sense of the term, words such as ‘I’, ‘here’, 
‘you’, ‘now’, and their brethren. Secondly, there are expressions which are obviously 
demonstratives, such as ‘this’ and ‘that’. Third, there are expressions that are obviously pronouns, 
such as ‘he’ and ‘she’.  Overt expressions that are in none of these classes are not context-dependent. 
If the truth-conditions of constructions containing them are affected by extra-linguistic context, this 
context dependence must be traced to the presence of an obvious indexical, demonstrative, or 
pronominal expression at logical form, or to a structural position in logical form that is occupied by a 
covert variable. (400) 
Stanley here actually gives four different categories of context-dependent items: indexicals, demonstratives, 
pronouns and covert variables.  However, the difference between demonstratives and indexicals does not 
seem particularly important for our taxonomic purposes (and Stanley makes nothing of it in the paper).  Nor 
does the distinction between pronouns and covert variables: Stanley treats covert variables as unpronounced 
pronouns, they can either have free uses determined by context or they can be bound by higher-up operators.  
The interesting hypothesis then, is that variables in context-sensitive expressions are just silent pronouns.  
Assuming a unified treatment of indexicals and demonstratives, this would yield an elegant dichotomy.   
Since we treat ‘red’ as falling into the first category, of demonstratives and indexicals, this picture is 
attractive for us also.  However, we will argue in this section that things are not actually so simple. 
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The dichotomous picture is problematic in a number of ways.  First, consider Stanley’s characterization of 
standard indexicals: 
The three central features of such words is, first, that they are primitive lexical items, second, that 
they are not bindable by operators, and, third, that their interpretation shifts from context to context.  
In fact, standard indexicals, unlike ‘red’, do exhibit certain bound readings.  First, in some languages such as 
Amharic, indexicals can be bound by the subject of a propositional attitude attribution.  Schlenker (2003) 
attributes this to the fact that standard indexicals actually get their value determined by reference to a 
context variable which propositional attitudes operators quantify over.  Moreover, Heim (in unpublished 
work reported in, e.g., Schlenker, 2003) gave some examples where indexicals seem to need to be treated 
like bound variables: 
(27) Only I did my homework. 
(28) I did my homework and John did too. 
In both cases a bound variable analysis of the first person pronoun seems necessary to get one of the 
readings.  
 
So, perhaps ‘real’ indexicals such as ‘I’ do not have a simple indexical semantics as Stanley suggests.  If 
this is the case we would still, absent further evidence, suggest a plain indexical analysis of ‘red’, making at 
least two categories of indexicals, words like ‘red’ that exhibit mere unbindable context-sensitivity, and 
words like ‘I’ that have a more complex semantics (to be discovered by further, cross-linguistic research).  
So we suggest that a) Stanley might mischaracterize indexicals, and b) words like ‘red’ should be 
considered as part of the semantic class of unbindable indexicals/demonstratives.  
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What about the other half of Stanley’s taxonomy, pronouns and variables?  We have already reduced the 
work that the class of variables needs to do, since we do not think it needs to cover all context-sensitive 
expressions that are not canonical indexicals/demonstratives.  But what about words like ‘enemy’ and 
‘local’ that do exhibit bindable context-sensitivity?  The interesting proposal here, advocated also by Marti 
(2003), is that these forms of context-sensitivity are due to variables that essentially act like unpronounced 
pronouns.   
 
Stanley offers some support for such a claim by arguing that, like pronouns, variables are subject to 
syntactic constraints such as weak cross-over.  We tested this hypothesis by checking some examples on 
ourselves and others in small email survey.  Our survey indicated that in fact the context-sensitivity of 
expressions such as ‘local’ and ‘enemy’ did not exhibit the same weak-crossover constraints as regular 
pronouns do.38 First of all, we found Stanley’s own data unconvincing:39 
(29) Heri local bar sponsored every reporteri.  
(30) A local bar sponsored every reporter (where the bar is local to each reporter) 
Stanley labels both (29) and (30) as ungrammatical.  However, almost everyone we surveyed found (29) to 
be awful, and (30), if flawed at all, merely inelegant or slightly awkward.  It is easy to find other examples 
where (non-pronominal) contextually-sensitive expressions don’t show weak cross-over effects.   For 
example, weak cross-over effects are extremely weak if present at all in implicitly bound uses of  ‘enemy’: 
(31) A political enemy sabotaged each congressman’s campaign (understood as an enemy of the 
congressman)  
(32) His political enemy sabotaged each congressman’s campaign.  
                                                
38 For a similar verdict with different examples see Carlson and Storto 
(forthcoming). 
39 These examples are from Stanley (2002), p. 423. 
 38 
While (32) is clearly awful, (31) sounds quite good.  This leads us to believe that positing covert pronouns 
to associate with bindable context-sensitive expressions is not syntactically well-motivated.  Without further 
study it is not even clear that the non-indexical context dependent expressions such as ‘enemy’ and ‘local’ 
form a unified class.   
 
This does not leave us with a very simple picture of context-sensitivity.  Here is a start of a taxonomy, 
though:  First, there are the classical indexicals, which seem to exhibit some limiting binding phenomenon 
(even in English), second, there are the truly unbindable indexicals (such as ‘here’ and the simple 
demonstrative ‘that’) to which category we add words like ‘red’, third, there are the normal pronouns, and 
fourth there are other expressions, such as ‘enemy’ and ‘local’, that seem neither to be straightforward 
indexicals (owing to their binding behavior) nor expressions with silent pronouns.  It would be desirable to 
give principled explanations of the differences (and/or deeper connections) between these categories, but 
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